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Stability and Reconstruction: Institutionalized in the United States Army?

by

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The United States Army is unmatched in its ability to conduct combat operations to defeat an adversary. The Army has developed the correct doctrine, organization, training and equipment to outmatch any opponent in combat operations. The cessation of hostilities in a combat environment however, rarely means the conclusion of the Army's role in an operation. A stable environment after the cessation of hostilities is the ultimate goal to achieve the political objectives that further the national interests of the United States. To create a stable environment, ready for a transition to civil authorities, the Army must plan, prepare and execute stability operations before, during and after major combat operations. In order to properly prepare for stability tasks, the Army must institutionalize the importance of conducting stability operations and prepare the force to conduct stability and reconstruction tasks through all phases of a joint operation.

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Abstract

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Stability and Reconstruction: Institutionalized in the United States Army?

First and foremost, the United States Military must fight and win our nations wars. Although the weapons and tactics used to fight wars change significantly from century to century, the fundamental nature of warfare has not changed. Nation states, and even non state actors, engage in combat operations to impose their will on an adversary for some desired political end state. In the case of the United States, our political interests revolve around four enduring national interests: security, prosperity, values and international order.[1] These four national interests, spelled out in the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, provide the overarching guidance as to the political end state of any conflict. Should the nation call on the military to conduct decisive action in support of national interests, the military must be prepared to prosecute a war with violence to quickly terminate hostilities. Equally important to further national interests, is the rapid transition to post conflict activities to help provide stability such that the international order is one of peace, security and opportunity. One should not make the mistake that the transition to post conflict activities occurs when the war is won. Post conflict activities are integral to winning the war. The well known phrase of "the three block war"[2] attests to the fact that stability operations are integral to any operation and occur during all phases of an operation. Post conflict activities are just as important in securing victory as violent combat operations.

Much recent thought has been devoted to determining the exact nature of stability operations at the strategic level. Determining the role of the United States Government (USG) during stability operations and reconstruction operations has proliferated itself in numerous articles and books. Just as important, however, is a clear understanding of who within the USG can, and should, accomplish stability and

reconstruction tasks. Although few people will contest the principle that successful stability operations requires a whole of government approach, practical experience has demonstrated that at the conclusion of hostilities, the bulk of stability tasks rest on the shoulders of the Department of Defense (DoD) and specifically the United States Army.[3] Recent published forecasts of the nature of conflict in the near future point to a preponderance of conflicts being regionally focused involving adversaries that have a weak central government and crippled economy.[4] The very nature of conflict and conflict resolution in this environment will cause the United States Army to conduct stability and reconstruction tasks with Interagency, Intergovernmental and multi-national partners. Because the USG lacks a credible process to bring together interagency efforts to accomplish stability and reconstruction operations, the United States Army needs to institutionalize the planning and execution of stability and reconstruction tasks. Instructed by joint doctrine, the Army continues to update stability doctrine, in the Doctrine 2015 model, with its recent publication of Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability*. That effort should expand into other areas of the Army institution. To accomplish this, the Army will need to make a concerted effort to change its culture, and recognize the importance of placing stability and reconstruction operations on par with combat operations. In examining the need and ability of the Army to conduct stability and reconstruction operations, this paper will strive to recommend changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF.)

In the context of a Joint operation, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, describes the different phases of an operation. Prior to any Joint operation,

the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) conducts phase 0, or shaping operations. Phase 1 is the deter phase, where joint forces influence an adversary by communicating a credible threat to influence behavior. Should deterrence fail, the joint force will seize the initiative, Phase II, in order to gain a decisive advantage over an adversary. Phase III, the dominate phase, consists of sustained and continuous operations to place an adversary in a position where it can no longer influence United States forces. These three phases focus on an adversary's capability to oppose the joint force. If the well known quote from Clausewitz remains true, "that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means"[5] then the political end of a military operation is rarely complete after phase III. For this reason, joint doctrine continues to define additional phases of an operation. The purpose of these additional phases become self evident; that a military operation is not complete at the conclusion of major combat operations. Phase IV, stabilization, continues the operation towards the desired national end state. During Phase V, enable civil authorities, the joint force transitions the operation to a legitimate civil authority and can begin to redeploy forces.[6]

Over the course of the past 60 years, the Unites States military has demonstrated numerous times that it can successfully conduct combat operations to dominate an adversary. Combat operations in Korea, Panama, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and even during Vietnam have left little doubt that the United States can dominate an adversary during phase's I-III. Even our most recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the ability of our armed forces to successfully conduct phase's I-III and destroy an adversary's ability to conduct full scale combat operations. Our recent

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan however, also reinforce the requirement for the Army to plan, prepare and execute phase IV and V operations. On March 19, 2003 the first bombs began to fall in Baghdad in what was to become known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF.) United States forces entered Baghdad on April 9th and on May 1st, President Bush declared that combat operations were at an end;[7] a mere 42 days after the first bomb was dropped. Thus began a nine year ordeal which epitomized the common phrase of "building the aircraft while in flight."

Prior to the initiation of hostilities in mid March, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) planning staff bustled with activity during the planning for the invasion of Iraq. The bulk of their planning efforts focused on planning phase's I-III. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR,) the CENTCOM planning for "Phase IV got short shrift".[8] It is evident from this statement that the focus of military planning efforts was on accomplishing the kinetic military objectives that would cause the defeat of the Iraqi Army and topple the Regime of Saddam Hussein. Not until December of 2002, did CENTCOM, with spurring by the Joint Staff, place additional emphasis on phase IV and V planning.[9] In a span of mere months, military planners had to develop a comprehensive, intergovernmental plan to cope with phase IV and V operations in Iraq.

Compare this effort with the depth of planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan following the end of hostilities after World War II. Despite initial problems of planning for the occupations of Japan and Germany, the initial planning effort began on 28 December, 1941, with the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign Policy.[10] Although the planning effort greatly evolved before any actual

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occupation duties began, GEN George Marshall and his planners had over two and a half years to determine how to conduct post conflict, or phase IV and V operations, at the conclusion of World War II. This effort led to the establishment of constabulary units charged with creating the conditions necessary for a transfer to civilian authorities. Despite the U.S. desire to bring all troops home by the middle of 1946, it soon became evident that the U.S. exit strategy was not going to work. It took adaptive and enlightened leaders to change the policy and develop a plan for a successful occupation.[11] Evolving policies that arose from the occupation of Germany and Japan may differ in other post conflict environments, but one concept was common in both occupations: The military and its leadership were responsible for, and executed the post conflict transition.

To be fair, political decisions made during the planning portions of the United States invasion of Iraq limited the total number of forces available for the execution of stability missions. In his critique of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Pulitzer-Prized winning author Thomas Ricks discusses the vast difference in opinion between some senior military leaders and the civilian leadership as to the size of the force that would be necessary in Iraq.[12] This constraint certainly contributed to the security problems immediately following the formal declaration of cessation of hostilities.[13] Despite this manpower constraint, military planners failed to fully account for the myriad of tasks that would need to be accomplished to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq. Likewise, Army units were not prepared to conduct stability operations once major combat operations were complete in their sectors.[14] Initial security problems created an environment where looting became rampant, further crippling Iraqi infrastructure. In addition to security

problems, combat units did not have a clear understanding of what types of stability tasks would most contribute to creating conditions for a hand over to host nation local authorities.

This lack of understanding can be evidenced thru the publication of several doctrine manuals since the invasion of Iraq. The Army's manual on conducting stability has been revised twice since the invasion of Iraq. The 2003 version of Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability*, was replaced by an updated version in 2008. The most recent doctrine for the United States Army regarding stability operations were the recently published ADP 3-07, *Stability*, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication, (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability,* both released in August, 2012. Likewise the Army recognized it lacked updated doctrine on conducting counterinsurgency operations and released FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006; the first time counterinsurgency doctrine has been updated in 20 years.[15] The timing of the release of these two manuals exemplifies how the Army tends to forget its lessons from previous conflicts. As Gordon Rudd explains in his book about the history of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) "In truth, the frequency of the American involvement in small wars and insurgencies has produced no refined method, and with each small war or insurgency, American military leaders and doctrine seem to be starting anew."[16] The Army in particular possesses a service culture that tends to focus on war fighting tasks and eschew post conflict activities. Military leaders and planners have the obligation to possess knowledge of historical perspectives and an understanding of both conflict and post conflict activities. Armed with this knowledge and understanding, leaders must then drive the planning process to account for post conflict stability tasks.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights the importance of the whole of government approach to strengthening our national capacity.[17] Additionally, it specifically charges the United States military to "continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at…stability operations…while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations."[18] Even before the publication of the 2010 NSS, the DoD recognized the importance of stability operations, and issued Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 (DoDI 3000.05,) "Stability Operations," in September 2009. This instruction establishes stability operations as a core United States military mission that will be accomplished with an equivalent proficiency to that of combat operations.[19] Furthermore, it directs the military to lead stability operations until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG agencies or foreign governments. It should come as no surprise that recent revisions of one of the Army's capstone doctrinal manuals, Army ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, included stability operations as one of the four types of operations that the Army must perform.[20]

So even before the publication of the President Obama's NSS, the DoD and United States Army recognized the important role that stability operations have in the context of the military's role in land operations. An examination of both joint and service doctrine reinforces the assertion that stability operations are a necessary mission which military forces must be able to accomplish. Policy and doctrine recognize and direct that to truly achieve the political end state of a military conflict, there must be a secure and stable environment. There must be a basic capacity for security and stability before civilian authorities can assume control. This basic capacity is not limited to building security forces, but must also include other tasks such as restoring basic infrastructure

and reestablishing public order. Despite the positive steps to develop doctrinal concepts for stability and reconstruction, military culture continues to push towards a focus on combat related tasks and skills. The American way of war has been one of annihilation and attrition. In his essay "Strategy in the Nuclear Age" Colin Gray provides eight characteristics that perfectly describe American strategic culture. Of these, the United States' indifference to history, reliance on engineering style and technical solutions, impatience, and blindness to cultural differences exemplify the way Americans think about and conduct warfare. Gray continues, "The United States transformed into military problems – and inelegantly but definitively solved through machine warfare – the political challenges that American Indians or menacing empires in Europe and Asia had posed."[21] This typical American way of war continues to permeate the culture of the military such that it continually seeks to offer numerical or technical solutions focused on classic combat activities. Certainly, the military cannot afford to diminish its capability to fight and win our nations wars; however, as both the NSS and DoDI 3000.05 direct, the Army must also be ready to conduct stability operations in support of national objectives. The Army must recognize its natural tendency to selectively forget lessons learned from previous conflicts so that it can continue to develop systems and processes to enable success in a wide variety of environments. Over the last twenty years, the Army recognized that it must plan and execute a wide range of military options and has updated its doctrine to reflect this recognition. Terminology has changed over time, so whether called peacekeeping operations, military operations other than war or stability operations, Army doctrine acknowledges there is more to conflict than successfully conducting air land battle, major combat operations or

decisive action. What is missing however, is an underlying cultural shift to recognize that combat operations only achieve a part of the strategic goal. Few can question that the education, training, doctrine, and equipment of the United States Army create conditions such that it can dominate an adversary in conventional war. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan also reinforce the adaptiveness of the U.S. Army to succeed in counterinsurgency operations. The question remains whether the Army possesses the correct institutional capabilities across the DOTMLPF to conduct successful stability operations. The transition from combat operations to stability tasks, and ultimately transition control to civil authorities, will naturally follow any combat operation. This transition could occur during any phase of the joint phase construct. The Army, its leaders and its Soldiers must be prepared for that transition.

Before we examine whether the U.S. Army fully institutionalizes stability operations beyond that of doctrine, what is the strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction? A 2009 study by members of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the United States Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) lists the major end states of stability and reconstruction operations. The five major end states listed in the project are: A safe and secure environment, established rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy and social well being.[22] These five end states are echoed in Army doctrine in ADP 3-07. ADP 3-07 further defines the Army's role in stability operations. The five primary Army stability tasks are: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. The doctrinal framework exists to focus commanders and planners in the

planning, preparation and execution of stability tasks. ADP 3-07, *Stability,* and ADRP 3-07, *Stability*, both appropriately define and explain stability tasks; however the appropriate emphasis in organization, training and leader development does not exist to the degree to enable leaders to be experts in stability operations, on par with their expertise in offensive and defensive operations.

Although every conflict presents a unique and challenging operational environment, the Army possesses adequate capabilities to conduct combat related tasks. When we consider for example the task to restore essential services, it becomes more difficult to accomplish these tasks given the current Army organization and training. Short term gains may be possible, but a sustained effort to restore essential services will need the involvement of other USG agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for example.[23] By examining other stability tasks, such as support to economic and infrastructure development, we can further see that the whole of government approach outlined in the NSS will be necessary for successful stability operations. In fact, the 2005 National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) assigned the Secretary of State the responsibility to coordinate an effective response that promotes peace, democracy and economic recovery.[24] In 2004, in anticipation of NSPD 44, the Department of State (DoS) established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The S/CRS mandate was to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and help reconstruct and stabilize a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from conflict and civic strife."[25] Even with such an impressive mandate, S/CRS struggled in its

first few years due to funding and staffing problems.[26] Eventually, S/CRS transitioned to the present DoS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CRO). Their mission is to strengthen U.S. national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crises in priority countries.[27]

Despite being charged by the President to coordinate post conflict stability operations, the DoS continues to struggle to develop a consistent organization to coordinate those efforts. Also, as seen by DoDI 3000.05, the DoD will assume a larger role in stability operations both during and after conflict. As discussed above, joint doctrine defines six phases of conflict: Phase 0, shape; Phase I, deter; Phase II, seize initiative; Phase III, dominate; Phase IV, stabilize; Phase V, enable civil authority. This phasing construct also emphasizes the recognition by DoD that they will assume many of the tasks related to stability operations. Clearly a whole of government approach is needed for successful stability operations; however few organizations have the capacity to conduct those operations. Many USG agencies such as DOS and USAID are committed to successful stability operations. Additionally, International Organizations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also play an important role in stability operations. Although the mandate exists for an interagency approach to stability and reconstruction, the reality is that most agencies lack the resources to conduct those tasks in anything but a fully stable and permissive environment. For example, USAID has a great capacity to provide aid and development assistance. However, with a presence in 87 countries and a staff of 3,658 employees augmented by 5,621 Foreign Service Nationals and other non-direct hires, they represent a limited presence on the ground. In fact, of the total 9,279 employees, only 6,597 serve overseas.[28] We can

observe a stark difference in USAID manning levels when we compare the current

staffing levels with those during the Vietnam War as depicted in the table below.[29]

Table 1.

Year[3]	US Direct Hires	Foreign Service Nationals	Total
1965	6828	8270	15098
1970	6959	7547	15050
1975	4365	2226	6591
1980	4058	1900	8256
1985	3623	1281	8017
1990	3488	1070	11401
1995	2981	5261	9152
2000	2124	4420	7474
2005	2398	4931	7320

Even more telling is the fact that in 1968, the year with the highest USAID

manning level in Vietnam, there were 5,095 USAID employees in Vietnam alone. This is

more than half the total manning of USAID today. Additionally, the total budget for

USAID amounts to only 1% of the U.S. budget. Although USAID possess a superb

capability to provide aid, they represent a small fraction of the potential USG effort and

are severely limited if the security situation is unstable. Likewise the DoS, an agency

with a global presence, lacks the robust manpower to engage in a country with fragile

stability and widespread problems created as a result of combat operations. Despite the

presidential mandate for the DoS to assume a lead role in post conflict stability, the DoS

and USAID do not possess adequate resources for stability operations. Until a more

robust capability exists to coordinate the efforts of the numerous parties willing to

participate in stability operations, the DoD and the Army in particular, must recognize

that stability and reconstruction tasks will fall to them. Depending on the security

environment, this could take years to accomplish as we have seen in Iraq and

Afghanistan. The Army must continue to build capabilities to conduct stability and limited reconstruction operations after combat operations cease. Military planners must develop plans for the transition from phase III to phase IV operations for every major operation. Likewise, military formations must have the organization, education and training to execute those plans.

As discussed previously, the Joint Staff and the Department of the Army have both developed updated doctrine that adequately discusses and develops the ideas and concepts for stability and reconstruction. What is needed now is a continued effort to develop additional systems and processes to enable the military to execute stability and reconstruction tasks. With the development and publication of ADP 3-07, where the five primary Army stability tasks are enumerated, the Army has set a foundation to further develop the institutionalization of stability and reconstruction operations. As the past decade has brought to the forefront, once the Army is in contact, it becomes very difficult to enact changes in training and preparing units for deployment. The development of training rotations at the three combat training centers is a prime example. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the three Combat Training Centers (CTCs) were focused on providing as realistic a combat environment as possible. The National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, CA focused on training brigade size formations to maneuver against and destroy an enemy formation. Likewise, the smaller but no less capable Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), later renamed the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center (JMRC), also trained units in Europe using combat related force on force training. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA provided realistic training for light infantry and airborne units. Although

extremely flexible in their ability to design rotations to achieve the training objectives of the participating unit, the major focus of the CTCs was to provide a realistic combat training scenario. The Army's ability to quickly defeat their opponents in both Iraq and the initial defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan is a testament to the value of conducting this type of realistic combat training. As the nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began to change, so too did the training at the CTCs. The CTCs had the flexibility to change training scenarios and alter the physical makeup of the training environment to better replicate the environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even with these changes, the CTCs where able to provide only a cursory experience of the complex environment that a unit would encounter in Iraq or Afghanistan. Without a deeper knowledge and understanding of how to operate in a post conflict environment, Soldiers and units will simply be exposing themselves to the types of missions they may face, without having a deeper understanding of how to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. The training received at the CTCs is the culminating experience for an organization, but is only as good as the foundation possessed by the Soldiers. More needs to be done before Soldiers arrive at the training center to prepare them, and their organizations for success in a complex environment that will naturally consist of stability and reconstruction tasks.

Take for example the preparation of an officer to command a battalion. It would be unheard of to select and assign a battalion commander to command an infantry or armor battalion without a depth of experience and knowledge in infantry or armor tactics. Battalion command follows a career of almost 20 years in which an officer held positions of increasing leadership responsibility from platoon and company level. That

same officer also served in numerous staff positions that provided further training and experience in planning and executing combat operations. Interspersed in these assignments are opportunities to receive formal education to deepen his knowledge of applying combat power. Much as a combat formation consists of a building block of smaller units where several platoons form into companies and several companies form into battalions and several battalions form into brigades, so too does a combat officers career consist of a building block of experiences that provide for increasing success at higher levels. This model of continual growth through education, training and experience is a valuable tool in honing the edge of our combat leaders. We must recognize that in addition to fighting complex battles, operations and wars, the Army will at some point transition from combat operations to stability operations.

Our leaders must also be able to transition their mindset and thinking to conduct stability operations. This transition will not occur by accident or because a leader can naturally make that transition. A leader must be trained and conditioned to understand that the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations is a natural progression following combat operations. Soldiers, officers in particular, need to fully understand that the ultimate goal of any combat operation is to set conditions so that United States national interests are achieved. Combat operations alone may not achieve these interests, so the military must be prepared to continue operations that provide security and stability.

The Army needs a drastic change in its culture such that thinking and planning for post conflict stability operations becomes the norm. With over two centuries of military tradition and now more than 65 years since the United States established itself

as the premier military force, this culture change will be extremely difficult. Leaders must embrace the concept that stability operations are a valid military operation and provide time for training those tasks in their training plans. The instruction from our national command authority is clear on stability operations and both Joint and Army Service doctrine have properly provided a solid foundation. It is essential for Army leadership to develop a culture of change to fully embrace the conduct of stability operations. This change obviously should not be a radical change where combat leaders have to choose between a focus on combat operations versus stability operations. That is why there should be a culture change where leaders naturally think about how to transition to stability operations following any combat operation. In a perfect situation, there will be local civil authorities capable of assuming the lead role for stability and reconstruction. Or, if the whole of Government approach succeeds, the transition to other USG agencies, like the Department of State, can occur and military forces can begin to redeploy. In the absence of any responsible civil authority however, the military must be prepared to assume the lead role for stability and reconstruction tasks. This means that leaders must acknowledge that stability operations are natural conditions following war. Military leaders must overcome their natural tendency to concentrate on war fighting activities and abstain from stability tasks. The foundational doctrine already exists to guide the Army in conducting stability operations. What is needed now is an emphasis on the importance to properly prepare for stability operations by updating our training and leader development programs to emphasize why and how to conduct stability operations.

Although a cultural shift is paramount to improving the ability of the Army to conduct post conflict stability operations, there must be a foundation built upon knowledge and experience to provide a leader with the skills to conduct stability operations. The development of leaders through the formal education system needs to include instruction of the importance of stability operations. Today's military leader must be an adaptive and agile leader who can solve complex problems. At the company commander level of leadership and above, leaders become less reliant on battle drills or rote problem solving steps to dominate their environment. They must become adaptive problem solvers. Beginning with the Captains Career Course (CCC,) young officers must be taught the doctrinal concepts of stability operations as well as introduced to the key contributors to assist in those operations. The USIP "*Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction*" is a superb primer to provide a foundation from which to expand. The curriculum in the CCC must remain relevant, current and challenging so that junior leaders develop a foundation for lifelong learning.[30] Building on this foundation, each level of officer education should include the use of scenarios that include stability operations. By beginning earlier in an officer's career, the Army can expand the base of who receives instruction on the importance of stability operations and provide depth to the knowledge of each recipient. One criticism of officer education in stability operations is that it occurs too late in an officer's career and has too narrow an audience. The premise being, that in depth study of stability operations does not occur until the Senior Staff College level, where the opportunities for attendance are limited and the timing comes too late in an officer's career.[31] One area where the Army can expand expertise in stability operations tasks is by providing opportunities for fellowships in organizations

that specialize in stability operations. Much like the congressional fellow program provides the opportunity to broaden the experience base of senior company grade officers, an internship with DoS, USAID or United States Institute of Peace (USIP) can provide valuable broadening experience for young officers. These assignments can expand to overseas assignments where both agencies benefit from the fellowship. USAID for example can benefit by having additional manpower in overseas positions while DoD benefits by developing future leaders thru experience. The Army is willing to invest heavily to provide a realistic environment to train a brigade combat team in the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. Surely it can provide the time to allow select officers to perform stability operations with an interagency partner. The ultimate goal of providing an education, which includes stability operations, is to develop dynamic thinkers who are problem solvers and not lock step followers of processes.

With the current budget environment and forecasted reductions in military strength due to the end of major operations in Iraq and soon in Afghanistan, it would be difficult to argue for an organizational change that recommends additional units specially trained for stability operations. The current focus on increasing functional capacity by building Civil Affairs (CA) capacity provides one answer. The Army can continue to improve capacity without a major shift in force structure by capitalizing on existing force structure. The Army displayed an amazing propensity for versatility in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Artillery units, for example, performed a wide variety of missions above and beyond their traditional roles of providing fires. Units transitioned to perform transportation tasks, security tasks and force protection tasks to name a few. Although these types of tasks were to some degree inherent in what portions of what an artillery

unit is designed to conduct, soldiers displayed extreme flexibility in transitioning to train

for those tasks. The key is an understanding of the projected mission, and providing a

realistic training environment to prepare for the task. The CTCs provide one answer,

and have expanded their capacity to include stability tasks in the training environment.

Major home station training events should also include scenarios which include stability

tasks. One opportunity to expand the expertise available to improve home station

training would be to include interagency fellowships on the staff of installation Mission

Support Elements (MSE.) By having interagency employees on the MSE staff, a senior

tactical commander can utilize this expertise to develop training scenarios, embed in a

training event as an advisor or replicate the functions the interagency organization

would perform.

Another opportunity to expand the number of experts who understand the

capabilities of interagency partners, how to coordinate with them, and improve basic

skills in contracting, would be to develop a home station short course on stability

operations. This would help provide brigades and battalions with the expertise to

develop a stability operations framework. What we must acknowledge, however, is the

decentralized nature of the environment precludes the pooling of this expertise at

echelons above brigade. The manpower for this expertise already exists within the

current organization. Officers on the planning staffs in brigades as well as staff officers

within a battalion can receive additional training on the conduct of stability operations.

There are ample examples of additional training classes conducted at the local

installation level that provide additional training. Training courses such as air assault

school, command supply discipline, and maintenance procedures already exist on

various installations across the Army. This type of home station training can expand to include expert instruction on stability and reconstruction operations. The goal of this training would be to have a qualified expert in every battalion who understands stability operations. Much like certified air assault instructors provide training to qualify Soldiers in air assault operations at different installations across the Army, CA experts can provide instruction at the local installation to qualify Soldiers in the basics of stability and reconstruction operations. Part of this instruction should include perspectives from subject matter experts who help provide the training. The Army will benefit with increased capacity at the battalion and above level, without incurring the cost of increasing organizational force structure.

A major organizational change which the Army should re-evaluate is the alignment of Civil Affairs under Special Operations Command (SOCOM.) Army doctrine dictates that all units will conduct offense, defense and stability during overseas operations. Stability operations are not a special type of operation, but a core competency which units must have. CA units are specially trained units to conduct stability tasks just as engineer units are specially trained to support offensive and defensive operations. Since stability operations are not a special operation, then the key organization to perform those tasks should be part of the conventional force. Sure there are certain funding benefits by having CA units fall under SOCOM, but policy and doctrine are clear that all Army units must conduct stability operations. CA units should be aligned with corps and divisions just as other support units are aligned. By this alignment, the corps and division commander would possess the assets to conduct quality training for unified land operations. The commander would also posses those

forces as organic assets to conduct unified land operations while deployed. As the Army continues to regionally align forces, commanders will already posses the CA expertise to plan, prepare and execute their regionally aligned mission.

One organizational change that is already occurring and should be expanded is the inclusion of interagency staff members on the GCC staff. Several GCCs have foreign political advisors (POLAD) on their staff with impressive titles such as the Deputy Commander for Civilian-Military Activities[32] or Civilian Deputy to the Commander,[33] but a full interagency effort needs to occur. Not only should staff positions be filled by government agencies such as DoS, USAID, Department of Justice and Department of Treasury, they should have the requisite authority to make decisions and possibly commit resources from their parent agencies. The ultimate goal of having a robust interagency staff would be to mitigate a repeat of the post conflict planning for the invasion of Iraq. A more robust interagency planning staff can generate options and align resources for post conflict stability operations. The added benefit of an interagency staff is the ability to provide planning and identification of resources for the shaping and deterrence phases of a joint operation.

The Army today is a much different Army than the Army that raced through the fields of France following the D-Day invasion. The doctrine, organization, equipment and training have significantly improved with improvements in technology. What has not improved is our ability to successfully transition from a successful combat operation to a long term stability operation. Our participation in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multi-National (JIIM) environment should not be limited to a belief that the key role of the POLAD is for the commander to "take my POLAD

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everywhere." The idea that by taking the POLAD everywhere, the commander has

solved the problem of interagency coordination is ludicrous. The Department of Defense

recognized and directed that stability operations are as important to achieving our

national interests as offensive and defensive operations. Certainly, combat operations

will dominate the bulk of resources and capabilities applied to a military problem,

however combat operations alone will not solve the political problem. The Army must

recognize the importance of continuing to apply resources to dominate the post conflict

environment. This focus on post conflict stability operations cannot simply be developed

by a planner sitting on a GCC staff prior to the initiation of hostilities. By drastically

changing the culture of the Army to embrace stability operations and increase the

knowledge level within the Officer Corps to understand and apply stability doctrine in a

JIIM environment, the Army can assist the joint commander in the effective use of

military forces to protect the interests of the United States.

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